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Abstract- Cache timing attack is a type of side channel attack 
where the leaking timing information due to the cache behaviour 
of a crypto system is used by an attacker to break the system. 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was considered a secure 
encryption standard until 2005 when Daniel Bernstein claimed 
that the software implementation of AES is vulnerable to cache 
timing attack. Bernstein demonstrated a remote cache timing 
attack on a software implementation of AES. The original AES 
implementation can methodically be altered to prevent the cache 
timing attack by hiding the natural cache-timing pattern during 
the encryption while preserving its semantics. The alternations 
while preventing the attack should not make the implementation 
very slow. In this paper, we report outcomes of our experiments 
on designing and implementing a number of possible 
countermeasures. 
 
Index Terms — Advanced Encryption Standard, Cache Timing 
Attack, Preventing Remote Attacks, Side Channel Attack  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Information security plays a major role in every 
computerized system today. Information of a particular 
institution should be stored and transferred securely without 
allowing unauthorized parties to access or modify them. At 
this instance, the concept of 'encryption' comes into the arena 
to keep secret information in unreadable manner even if the 
intruders acquire the system or the message. Encryption can 
be informally defined as the original data (known as plain 
text) is converted into an unreadable or meaningless data 
(known as cipher text) using an algorithm and a secret key. 
Therefore, even if an intruder steals the secret information 
(the converted data), they are unreadable without the secret 
key (generally, the algorithm is of public knowledge). 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is such an 
encryption algorithm. It has become the US Federal Standard 
for information security after DES, Data Encryption 
Standard, which has become breakable. AES is an evolved 
version of the Rijndael algorithm developed by John Daemen 
and Vincent Rijmen [1]. AES uses a fixed block size of 128-
bit (16 bytes) and a key of size 128-bit, 192-bit or 256-bit.  
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According to the size of the key, the number of rounds for 
encryption is varied. They are 10, 12 or 14 rounds for 128-bit, 
192-bit or 256-bit key respectively. In each round except the 
final round, four operations are taken part. They are Sub 
Bytes, Shift Rows, Mix Columns and Add Round Key. Byte 
arrays of size 4x4 (16 bytes) are used for each of these 
operations. After a particular number of rounds according to 
the size of key, the plain text is converted into the cipher text.  
The main feature of side channel attacks is that they do not 
focus on breaking the cryptographic algorithm through 
algorithmic weaknesses of it [2]. Instead, they use leaking 
information from the cryptographic system. There are various 
kinds of side channels available: leaking timing information, 
electromagnetic radiation, acoustic signals, visual or light 
signals, and power consumption are the major ones. By 
carefully gathering and analysing those leaking information 
an attacker will be able to extract the secret information from 
a system. Since this is not based on mathematically breaking 
the cryptographic algorithm and it is very difficult to fully 
stop the information leakage of the crypto system, side 
channel attacks have become a huge threat for the security of 
the information.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Location of the L1 cache on a Processor Chip (CPU) 
 
Cache Timing Attacks are a kind of side channel attacks, 
which uses leaking cache timing information as the side 
channel. At the time of execution, variables, data structures 
and other memory elements used for a particular program are 
loaded into the main memory (RAM). Cache memory is a 
high-speed memory, which is located in the processor for 
making the memory access faster through spatial and 
temporal locality as shown in Fig 1 (L1 Cache). Typically, the 
recently accessed memory areas are loaded into the cache. 
Since its high cost, cache memory is limited in size and only a 
limited amount of data can be stored. When a program needs 
to read a memory word, cache hardware checks to see if the 
line needed is in the cache. If so a cache hit occurs, the 
request is satisfied from the cache and no memory request is 
sent to the main memory. A cache hit normally takes two 
clock cycles [3]. When the memory word that the processor is 
looking for is not found in the cache, a cache miss happens, 
L2 Cache 
CPU L1 Cache
where the data have to be taken from the main memory (or 
from L2 cache), and therefore it takes longer time than cache 
hits. The time difference due to cache hits and misses are used 
as leaking timing information from the crypto system to 
perform cache timing attack. 
If an attacker can collect the information about cache hits 
and misses of a software implementation of AES and then 
analyse them, he can get an idea about the process inside the 
system. This process and the knowledge about the 
cryptographic algorithm can be used to deduce the secret key 
of a crypto system. If the secret key could be found then the 
secrecy of the information is lost. Therefore, the secret 
information is open to intruders and AES becomes useless.  
In this paper, we use a cache timing attack proposed by 
Daniel Bernstein [4] as the base of our experiments. We have 
implemented and tested a number of countermeasures against 
the attack proposed by Bernstein and proved that the 
countermeasures are working against remote cache timing 
attack. We have also evaluated the overheads of the proposed 
countermeasures. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: related work 
is presented in Section II. In Section III, we discuss an 
investigation on Bernstein’s attack. Section IV has details on 
countermeasures we implemented against Bernstein’s attack 
and Section V on performance impact of experimented 
countermeasures. In Section VI, we conclude the paper. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
In year 2005, Daniel Bernstein pointed out [4] that AES is 
still vulnerable for timing attacks. He used 850MHz Pentium 
III desktop computer running FreeBSD 4.8 as a network 
server. He used OpenSSL 0.9.7a AES implementation in his 
server. The complete AES secret key was extracted using a 
client machine, which is connected to the network. After 
successfully completing the attack, he stated that the same 
technique could be used to extract complete AES key from 
most complicated servers, which handle Internet data, 
although the attackers would need additional timing data to 
average out the effects of network delays. He also stated that 
this attack was not limited to Pentium III processors. As he 
has tested an AMD Athlon, an Intel Pentium III, an Intel 
Pentium M, an IBM PowerPC RS64 IV, and a Sun 
UltreSPARC III processors also show comparable level of 
OpenSSL timing vulnerability. 
Kocher et al. [5] has stated that by carefully measuring the 
amount of time required to perform private key operations, 
attackers might be able to find fixed Diffe-Hellman 
exponents, factor RSA keys, and break other cryptosystems. 
He also stated that these kinds of attacks are computationally 
inexpensive and often required a known cipher text. He 
pointed out that actual systems are potentially at risk 
whenever attackers could get reasonably accurate timing 
measurements. 
David Brumley and Dan Bosh [6] have stated that timing 
attacks could not only be used for weak computing devices 
like smart cards but also applicable to attack general software 
systems. They have done an experiment to extract the RSA 
private key from OpenSSL based web server in a local area 
network. Their result showed that even if two virtual 
machines (network server virtual machine for making 
decryption queries and secure virtual machine for storing 
RSA private key) were running in the same machine for more 
protection of RSA private key, the network server virtual 
machine can extract the RSA private key from the secure 
virtual machine. 
Felten et al. [7] have pointed out that since browsers 
perform various forms of caching, the time required for 
operations depends on the user's browsing history and this 
time variations convey enough information to compromise 
user's privacy. They have claimed that these attacks could not 
be prevented from simple countermeasures. Therefore, they 
have described a way of re-engineering browsers. In their 
paper, they have mentioned one fascinating example. Say, 
there are three people called A, B and C. Suppose that A is 
surfing the web and visits both B's and C's websites. If A 
want to know whether B has visited C's web site recently 
what A has to do is as follows. First, A access C's website and 
picks a file that can be seen by anyone who accesses C's 
website. Now A has to determine whether this file is in B's 
web cache. Therefore, A has to write a Java applet that 
implements the attack and embeds it in his home page. When 
B visits A's web site that applet automatically downloads and 
runs in B's browser. The applet measures the time required to 
access that particular file in C's web site. If that time is less 
than some threshold, A can conclude that B has visited C's 
website recently.  Turning off caching, alternating hits or 
miss performance and turning off Java and Java Scripts are 
some of their countermeasures. 
Tromer et al. [8] have described several software based 
side channel attacks based on inter-process leakage through 
the state of the CPU's memory cache. This leakage reveals 
memory access patterns. The attacks allow unprivileged 
process to attack other process running in parallel on the same 
processor even if partitioning method are available. They 
have also demonstrated an extremely strong type of attack, 
which requires knowledge of neither the specific plain texts 
nor cipher text but works by merely monitoring the effect of 
the cryptographic process on the cache.  Avoiding memory 
access, alternative lookup tables, data independent memory 
access pattern and application specific algorithmic masking 
are some of the countermeasures proposed by them. 
    In Bernstein's paper, he has proposed several 
countermeasures. He is mostly concerned about constant time 
AES implementations. In order to achieve this task he has 
proposed many hardware level and software level solutions 
and discussed many practical problems of them. Finally, he 
has stated that it cannot be guaranteed that the fetched T-table 
values will exist in the cache until the encryption process 
ends. Therefore, it is very difficult to achieve constant time 
AES. Paul Kocher stated that this constant time approach is 
good for masking timing characteristics. He targeted the 
discussion on Diffie-Hellman, RSA and DSS systems. He 
also stated that techniques used for blinding signatures could 
also be adapted to prevent attackers from knowing the input 
to the modular exponentiation function. David Brumley and 
Dan Bosh stated that most widely accepted defence against 
timing attacks is to perform RSA blinding. Secondly, they 
stated that making all RSA decryptions not dependent upon 
the input ciphertext. Besides this, they have proposed that 
making all RSA computations to be quantized would be 
another alternative. In Tromer et al. several countermeasures 
are proposed. They have stated that since these methods have 
different trade-offs and architecture and application 
dependency, a single recipe for all implementers cannot be 
recommended. Avoiding memory access, data independent 
memory access pattern, cache state normalization and process 
blocking and disabling cache access are some of advanced 
countermeasures they have proposed. To achieve them mostly 
the kernel support is needed. In this paper, we have 
implemented and tested some basic ideas extracted from the 
above researches. We have implemented them in a real 
system and tested their performance. 
  
III. REVISITING BERNSTEIN'S ATTACK  
Our attack environment is setup as demonstrated by 
Bernstein [4]. What Bernstein proposed is a technique to 
reduce the AES keyspace and then to perform brute-force to 
find the final key. The key-space reduction was made 
possible through the timing information collection. 
We collected timing measurements on how long it takes to 
perform brute-force search on various sizes of key 
combinations so that we could use it to see the feasibility of 
the attack when the reduced key combinations are obtained 
from the timing information as in Bernstein attack. We have 
used Intel Pentium Dual Core, 2.1GHz processor for the 
timing measurement and the results are reported in Table I. 
 
TABLE I 
TIME TAKEN TO PERFORM BRUTE-FORCE SEARCH ON THE REDUCED KEY 
SPACE 
Key Space Time for brute-force search (s)
102 0.01 
103 0.02 
104 0.02 
105 0.02 
106 0.09 
107 0.53 
108 4.58 
109 40.23 
1010 348.23 
1011 2977.83 
1012 24512.69 
We used the data in Table I to plot the graph shown in 
Figure 2. It was a linear graph with a gradient of 2.4x10-8 
using which we obtained Equation (1) to estimate the time 
required in second for brute-force searching in the particular 
machine. 
 
SearchTime = 2.4 x 10-8 x keyspace --- (1) 
 
Fig. 2. Search Time verses the Key-space 
 
IV. COUNTERMEASURES 
In order to prevent cache timing attacks there are two major 
approaches to be followed. One is masking the leaking timing 
information and the other one is stopping information 
leakage. Second approach is very difficult to be implemented. 
Therefore, we took the first approach. In order to mask the 
leaking timing information, some disturbances should take 
place within the useful work. Therefore, there are several 
code fragments added into the AES implementation without 
changing its semantics. We tried to do these disturbances 
without heavily reducing the original efficiency of AES and 
they are described below. 
 
1.  Random 'for' loops 
As a countermeasure against cache-timing attacks, a 
random for loop was included in the AES implementation. 
First, a random number between 0 and 20 was generated and 
a ‘for loop’ was run from zero to the generated number. 
Algorithm 1 shows the code fragment implemented. 
The random_loop() function in Algorithm 1 was called in 
AES_encrypt function. Before every encryption, random 
number is generated and random loop is run. This changes the 
encryption time significantly. Generating a random number 
spends nearly 3800 clock cycles and running a random for 
loop up to 20 iterations may spend about 100 or 200 clock 
cycles in the 733MHz server machine. 
After using the changed AES implementation in the server 
and performing the attack, it is observed that some of the key 
bytes were missing. Because of incorrect timing information 
received from the server, the attacker could not correctly 
identify the actual timing pattern. 
 
/** Generate random number between 0 and 20*/ 
int gen_random(){ 
 int iseed = (int)time(NULL); 
  srandom (iseed); 
   return rand()%20; 
 } 
/** Random for loop**/ 
int random_loop(){ 
 int x=gen_random(); 
 int i=0; 
 int cnt=0; 
 for(i=0;i<x;i++){ 
  cnt++; 
  } 
 return 0; 
 } 
Algorithm1. Random ‘for’ loops 
 
When measuring the average number of cycles for 
encryption of 800-byte packets, it takes around 5062 clock 
cycles for original AES implementation while this changed 
AES consumes around 9303 clock cycles. This is 1.84 times 
higher than the number of cycles taken for unprotected AES 
implementation. It is observed that generating a random 
number consumed a long time compared to running a loop.  
 
2. Specified 'for' loops 
Random ‘for’ loops is a successful countermeasure. 
However, generating a random number consumes large 
number of CPU clock cycles and hence the AES encryption 
becomes slower. Therefore, the concentration is on a method 
based on loops but not generating a random number. 
Here number 1777 is used as an initial number (there is no 
specific reason to choose this number). Then this number is 
divided by 17. The rounded answer is 104 and a ‘for’ loop is 
run from 0 to 104 at the beginning of an encryption. Then 
number 104 is divided by 17 and the rounded result is 6. Then 
‘for’ loop is run from 0 to 6 times at the beginning of next 
encryption. Then number 6 is divided by 17 and the rounded 
result is 0. When the result is less than 6 the initial number 
1777 is taken again. Likewise, the above steps were repeated.  
A 'for loop' of 104 and then a 'for loop' of 6 is run 
repeatedly until encryptions occurring. Besides this, the 
division operation is also affecting the runtime of the 
encryptions. Algorithm 2 is the code fragment of the 
implementation. 
The above for_loop() function was called in AES_encrypt 
function. Using this changed AES version some of the key 
bytes could be hidden. When measuring the average number 
of cycles for encryption of 800-byte packets, it takes around 
5062 clock cycles for original AES implementation while this 
changed AES consumes around 5599 clock cycles. This is 
1.11 times higher than the number of cycle needed for 
unprotected AES implementation. 
 
 
static int gen = 1777; // initial number 
int for_loop(){ 
 gen =(int)gen/17; 
 int i=0; 
 int cnt=0; 
 if(gen<6) 
  gen=1777;// initial num 
 else{ 
  for(i=0;i<gen;i++){ 
   cnt++; 
   } 
  } 
 return 0; 
 } 
 
Algorithm 2. Specified 'for' loops 
 
3. Pre-fetching T-table values 
This is another way of masking the leaking timing 
information. Here, we used four, 16-element arrays to pre-
fetch the values from four T-tables. Before the encryption, 
some values of T-tables are read into those arrays. Therefore, 
the T-table values are loaded into the cache memory before 
the encryption.  
However, we cannot guarantee that those values remain in 
the cache until the encryption process finishes. Because they 
can be removed from the cache when other needed data are 
loaded into the cache. However, when fetching some T-table 
values may be loaded into the cache before the encryption. It 
may cause to change the pattern of cache hits and misses 
when compared to the unprotected AES implementation. 
Because of this pre-fetching some needed T-table value can 
be loaded into the cache which value may not be loaded into 
the cache when using the unprotected AES. Otherwise, 
because of this pre-fetching some value may be evicted from 
the cache to provide room for newly loading values.  
 
/*******four arrays to pre fetch********/ 
 u32 pre_fetch1[16]; 
 u32 pre_fetch2[16]; 
 u32 pre_fetch3[16]; 
 u32 pre_fetch4[16]; 
/** integers to manage array indices***/ 
 static int end_ind=16; 
 static int start_ind=0; 
 
Algorithm 3. Pre-fetching tables 
 
This method is quite different compared to the two 
previous methods. Methods 1 and 2 did not change the 
pattern of cache hits and misses. Instead, they simply add 
some randomness to the encryption process. However here it 
changes the original pattern of cache hits and misses while 
adding some extra time consuming process into the 
encryption process. Some extra time consumption is to read 
the T-table values into an array. In the implementation we 
have used a ‘for loop’ for this and it will add some little extra 
time consumption in the encryption. 
Instead of 16 element arrays, we can use larger sized 
arrays. However, it may reduce the efficiency and most of 
pre-fetched T-table values can be removed from the cache 
since the cache has limited space. We can do some 
experiment with the optimal size of those arrays. Algorithm 3 
is the code fragment of the implementation. 
AES_encrypt function is included in Algorithm 4. 
 
….. 
int i=0;//pre fetching for loop 
r = key->rounds >> 1; 
for (;;) { 
/***********pre fetching**********/ 
 for(i=start_ind;i<end_ind;i++){ 
  pre_fetch1[i]=Te0[i]; 
  pre_fetch2[i]=Te1[i]; 
  pre_fetch3[i]=Te2[i]; 
  pre_fetch4[i]=Te3[i]; 
  } 
 asm("nop"); 
 /********************************/ 
 start_ind+=16; 
 end_ind+=16; 
 if(end_ind>256) 
  end_ind=16; 
 if(start_ind>192) 
  start_ind=0; 
 ….... 
 
 Algorithm 4. Pre-fetching 
 
When measuring the average number of cycles for 
encryption of 800-byte packets, it took around 5062 clock 
cycles for unprotected AES implementation while the 
changed AES consumes around 5649 clock cycles. This is 
1.12 times higher than the number of cycles in the original 
AES implementation. 
 
4.  Cache Partitioning 
Another good way of preventing attack is cache 
partitioning. Here, we have allocated cache locations to load 
T-table values. Because of this allocated locations particular 
set of T-table values are loaded into a particular location. 
Therefore, those locations are not overwritten by other data, 
which are loaded into the cache. This may change the original 
pattern of cache accessing when an encryption is performing. 
In order to partition the cache the programmer must have 
understanding of the cache size of that specific machine. 
Algorithm.5 shows the code fragment of cache partitioning. 
When measuring the average number of cycles for 
encryption of 800-byte packets, it takes around 5062 clock 
cycles for original AES implementation while this changed 
AES consumes around 3015 clock cycles. This is 0.60 times 
higher than the number of cycles in the unprotected AES 
implementation. This is very different compared to the other 
countermeasures. Time taken to encrypt the altered AES is 
lower than the unprotected AES. This might be because there 
are allocated memory areas to store T- table values and the 
values might be residing in the cache for longer time and it 
might have reduced the encryption time.  Since most of the T-
table values are available in the cache for the entire process 
cache miss rate may be reduced. Therefore, that might change 
the original pattern of encryption in unprotected AES and 
hence values may be missed. 
 
…. 
static const u32 Te0[256]__attribute__((aligned(0x10)))= 
{…...}; 
static const u32 Te1[256]__attribute__((aligned(0x1000))) = 
{…..}; 
static const u32 Te2[256]__attribute__((aligned(0x10000))) = 
{…..}; 
static const u32 Te3[256]__attribute__((aligned(0x100000))) 
= {…..}; 
static const u32 Te4[256]__attribute__((aligned(0x1000000) 
))  =  {…..}; 
…..... 
 
Algorithm 5. Cache partitioning 
 
Performing more experiments on this countermeasure to 
verify its behaviour is proposed as a future work.  
 
V. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON 
If a countermeasure can miss a single key byte and the 
attacker knows the position where the byte is missed, the 
attacker has to perform a search on 256 times larger key 
space since there are 256 possible values for each byte 
position. Therefore, it makes it difficult to attack even the 
attacker knows the position where the byte is missed. 
However, if that clue is also unavailable to the attacker, it 
makes the attack even harder.  If few key bytes were missed 
the key space would be larger in some power (number of 
bytes missing) of 256. Therefore, missing a key byte makes 
the key space larger and it makes the searching harder. 
As we have reported in the previous section, different 
countermeasures have shown different amount of overheads. 
These overheads directly affect the efficiency of the AES 
implementation. If we look at the number of byte values 
missed for a particular countermeasure, it will also help us to 
compare them with each other. Therefore, we took average 
number of missing bytes in each countermeasure. Table II 
shows the performance information of each countermeasure. 
These are measured using 800-byte packets. Column two of 
the table lists the number of key bytes missing in the reduced 
keyspace after the attack. This is out of the total key 16bytes. 
The more the missing values, the better the countermeasure 
is. Column 3 is the number of clock cycle required for the 
countermeasure and the last column is the overhead of the 
countermeasure as a number of times compared to the 
original. 
TABLE II 
PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OF EACH COUNTERMEASURE 
Countermeasure Avg. no of 
missing key bytes 
(m) 
Avg. no of clock 
cycles per 
encryption 
(c) 
X times slower 
than original AES
(s) 
Random 'for' 
loops 
7 9303 1.84 
Specified 'for' 
loops 
8 5599 1.11 
Pre-fetching 10 5649 1.12 
Cache 
partitioning 
14 3015 0.60 
 
Figure 5 and 6 show the graphical representation and 
therefore a comparison of the results. 
 
Fig. 5. Graph of countermeasures and information about how much they are 
slower than the original AES 
 
Using this information, we propose Equation (2) to 
measure efficiency of the countermeasures tested. It would 
give an estimate about the efficiency of the countermeasure. 
Where m is the number of missing values and s is the 
performance.  
                                                                
                                                                --------- (2) 
                                                                 
When using this equation we have to consider boundary 
cases. That is, when the efficiency is zero that implies either 
m is zero or 1/s is zero. 1/s is zero means s is very large and 
hence the implementation is very slow. If m is zero, it means 
all the key bytes are available in the potential key space and 
still there is a possibility to search the correct key (may be 
vulnerable to attack). However, if most of the values from 0-
256 are available in all 16 key byte positions, performing a 
search is impossible (strong defence). Therefore, when 
efficiency is zero we have to consider the boundary cases 
discussed here. 
According to the equation derived, we have measured 
efficiencies of above four countermeasures.  
 
Efficiency (Random 'for' loops)    =   3.80 
Efficiency (Specified 'for' loops)  =   7.20 
Efficiency (pre-fetching)               =   8.93 
Efficiency (Cache partitioning)     =  23.33 
 
Fig. 6. Graph of countermeasures and number of missing key bytes 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have designed and implemented four 
countermeasures against the remote cache timing attack 
proposed by Daniel Bernstein. The countermeasures are 
compared for their efficiency and overheads. Besides, we 
have briefly considered a way to quantify their efficiency and 
have proposed an estimate using available parameters.  
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